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Abstract
An explicit retrocausal model is used to analyze the general Wood-Spekkens argu-
ment [1] that any causal explanation of Bell-inequality violations must be unnaturally
fine-tuned to avoid signaling. The no-signaling aspects of the model turn out to be ro-
bust under variation of the only free parameter, even as the probabilities deviate from
standard quantum theory. The ultimate reason for this robustness is then traced to
a symmetry assumed by the original model. A broader conclusion is that symmetry-
based restrictions seem a natural and acceptable form of fine-tuning, not an unnat-
ural model-rigging. And if the Wood-Spekkens argument is indicating the presence
of hidden symmetries, this might even be interpreted as supporting time-symmetric
retrocausal models.
1 Introduction
Bell’s theorem has ruled out local past-common-cause explanations of some correlations
observed in entanglement experiments, but this has not stopped research into more
general causal explanations of such phenomena in terms of spacetime-local beables. The
options on the table include superluminal causal influences, retrocausal explanations,
and a casual restriction on the measurement settings themselves. It has recently been
noted byWood and Spekkens that all of these causal explanations would seem to require
substantial “fine-tuning” in order to prevent the possibility of nonlocal signaling. [1]
Indeed, our experience and intuition tell us that causal relationships almost always
include a signal channel. If Alice can cause something near Bob, we would naturally
expect that she could signal to Bob as well. Wood and Spekkens correctly point out
that the no-signaling theorems (combined with Bell-inequality violations) are therefore
a major challenge to any causal explanation of entanglement phenomena.
However, our intuition on matters of causation and signaling have arisen from com-
mon experience. We are used to having access to certain resources (low entropy sources)
and we are used to being subject to certain constraints (the second law of thermody-
namics). In different situations, our intuitions are not so accurate. For example, in a
maximum-entropy universe, filled with a blackbody electromagnetic spectrum, it would
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be impossible to use a polarizing cube to signal. (This assumes the cube was also at
thermal equilibrium with the field, preventing it from casting shadows.)
Certainly, our choice of cube-orientation could cause an outcome; given the input
radiation to the cube, different choices would correspond to different output radiation.
But without knowing the microscopic fluctuations in the incoming radiation, there
would be no way to send a signal. Indeed any resulting signal would be a provable
failure of the second law, with the cube’s controller playing the role of Maxwell’s
Demon. So in this (entropically highly probable) situation we would expect generic
causation without signaling.
With this point in mind, one strategy in addressing the Wood-Spekkens challenge
would be to find a causal explanation in a framework where our intuition does not
have much experience. The obvious candidate from the above list of possibilities is
retrocausal accounts of entanglement (especially given the possible relevance of the
thermodynamic arrow of time, highlighted by the above example and related discussion
[2]). Another strategy would be to find a specific model that could be analyzed on
charges of “fine-tuning”; specific models are certainly more amenable to such analysis
than generic arguments. This paper therefore takes up the Wood-Spekkens challenge
by analyzing a recent quantitative retrocausal account of Bell-inequality violations.
Although retrocausal models may be instinctively distasteful, the alternative to
taking up their challenge is to retreat from causal explanations of these phenomena
entirely (dropping back to mere inferential explanations). As Wood and Spekkens
note, “the idea of explaining correlations causally appears to us to be central to the
scientific enterprise.” ([1], emphasis added) We fully agree with this point; no matter
how distasteful retrocausality may appear, giving up on any attempt to find a causal
explanation of reproducible phenomena would be far worse.
After outlining the retrocausal model in Section 2, the Section 3 analysis will con-
sider variations to a natural free parameter in the model, a parameter that must be very
small to recover the standard quantum probabilities. We will show that varying this
parameter deviates the results from quantum mechanics, but still does not allow any
signaling. This curious result therefore implies a large class of causal-but-non-signaling
models. According to Wood-Spekkens, all of these models are likely fine-tuned in some
manner. (Another implication is that these models allow a smooth deviation from the
Tsirelson bound, which may be useful in probing this bound’s ultimate nature.)
The section 4 analysis then finds the source of the fine-tuning in these explicit
models, which can be traced to a basic symmetry. In general, imposing symmetries
is itself a sort of “fine tuning”, in that a large parameter space is restricted to a
special (symmetrical) subset. Indeed, “symmetry protection” is a standard argument
when justifying fine-tuned masses in particle physics. [3] The question of whether such
restrictions are unnaturally fine-tuned, then, turns on the naturalness of the symmetry
in question. In section 5, this question will be explored in a more general context,
considering all live options for causal explanations of entanglement-based correlations.
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2 The Retrocausal Model
2.1 Schulman’s One-Particle Model
The two-particle entanglement model we shall be considering has been outlined in a
recent paper [4], with further motivation to be found elsewhere [5, 6]. It is based on
a one-particle model proposed by Schulman [7], and understanding this one-particle
model is central to understanding the two-particle model. Indeed, the two-particle
model is essentially a trivial extension.
Schulman’s model applies to a single spin-1/2 particle on a known path, subject to
two consecutive measurements. The spin-vector S represents the actual state of the
system at any given time (say, a vector on the Bloch sphere). This vector is meant
to map to the expectation value of the spin operator 〈S〉 for a pure state, at least
at points where the state is explicitly measured. Schulman proposed an ansatz that
between any two measurements, this spin-vector is permitted to undergo an anomalous
rotation through a net angle α with a global probability proportional to
W (α) =
1
α2 + γ2
. (1)
Here γ is a small free parameter in the model that cannot go to zero without making
W (α) ill-defined for anomaly-free histories. It is also important to note that these
(unnormalized) global probability weights are assigned to entire histories, not particular
instants. Finally, note that these rotation anomalies are confined to a single plane of
rotation, as determined by the boundary conditions, which will now be discussed.
All spin measurements on the particle are imposed as boundary conditions. This
is considered normal for the preparation; if one initially measures the spin in some
particular direction Si, it is standard to assume that the prepared spin-vector is aligned
with Si. But here, there is no projection postulate upon measurement; if the second
measurement finds the spin to be in some particular direction Sf , then this direction is
imposed as a final boundary condition on the spin-vector, just like the preparation. If
Si 6= Sf , and if there is no standard dynamical process which would take the former to
the latter, then an anomalous rotation must necessarily occur. This anomaly rotates
the spin-vector by an angle α, with a probability distribution proportional to W (α)
over all allowable rotations.
The only asymmetry between past and future in Schulman’s model comes in as a
restriction on the experimenters themselves. If Alice is making the first measurement,
and Bob is making the second measurement, both Alice and Bob can arbitrarily choose
the angles of their spin-measurement settings. (Their choice arises from outside the
system of interest, effectively as free external boundary conditions on the particle.) But
only Alice can select the actual outcome (choosing one of two possibilities, ±h¯/2), and
send the corresponding particle to Bob. Bob has no control over his actual outcome,
and can only read off the sign of the result.
We take this obvious and well-known asymmetry to be a consequence of the second
law of thermodynamics constraining Alice and Bob. For whatever reason, they only
have knowledge of their past, not their future. So Alice can block transmissions that
do not have the outcome she desires, but by the time Bob learns his outcome, it is too
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late to block the transmission at his end. (More accurately, at the spacetime locations
where Bob thinks he could choose to block a transmission, he does not have epistemic
access to the outcome of his measurement.)
Suppose Alice and Bob make consecutive spin measurements, each in some par-
ticular chosen direction, and their two chosen angles differ by θ. Alice chooses her
spin-vector output to be aligned with her setting angle; her outcome is always +h¯/2.
But Bob cannot make such a choice; the spin-vector will either be aligned (+h¯/2) or
anti-aligned (−h¯/2) with his chosen direction. These two possibilities are the two pos-
sible final boundary conditions on the particle. Therefore, the net anomalous rotation
between measurements must be either θ (mod 2pi) or pi + θ (mod 2pi), corresponding
to Bob’s two possible outcomes.
But note that W (α) is not a cyclic function; W (θ) is different from W (θ+2pi). To
generate probabilities, then, one must sum over all possible anomalous rotations that
lead to the same result. Schulman finds this ratio of probabilities as
P (θ)
P (pi + θ)
=
∞∑
n=−∞
W (2npi + θ)
∞∑
n=−∞
W (2npi + pi + θ)
=
cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2) tanh2(γ/2)
sin2(θ/2) + cos2(θ/2) tanh2(γ/2)
. (2)
In the limit that γ → 0, this reduces to the standard Born rule probabilities,
because the tanh2(γ/2) terms go to zero. Specifically, since one of these two outcomes
must occur, normalization allows one to reduce the ratio of probabilities to absolute
probabilities. In this case, the probability Bob finds the (+h¯/2) outcome is P (θ) =
cos2(θ/2). And since γ is an arbitrary parameter, Schulman’s ansatz can be made
arbitrarily close to the Born rule.
Note that Schulman’s one-particle model is effectively retrocausal. If Bob chooses
the same measurement angle as Alice, there will never be any anomalous rotation. But
if Bob chooses a different angle, then before he makes his choice, an anomalous rotation
may occur. Because Bob’s future choice determines whether or not past anomalies will
occur, this is a retrocausal model – as generally is any model with a choosable final
boundary condition. The “bilking” argument (that Bob may find out the spin-vector
and therefore learn about his future choice before he makes it) is naturally resolved by
the link between measurements and boundary conditions; the only way to directly learn
anything about the spin-vector is to physically make an intermediate measurement,
which would change the boundaries of the experiment. Also note that this block-
universe style of retrocausal model does not remove Bob’s free choice of setting; that
is coming from outside the system of interest, as an effective external boundary.
Even at this stage, Schulman’s model is an example of (retro-)causation without
(retro-)signaling; Alice can’t learn about intermediate anomalous rotations, and so
can’t detect Bob’s future setting. The Wood-Spekkens paper then raises the question
of whether this one-particle model is already fine-tuned, even before the extension to
entanglement. For now, we simply note that the below analysis will consider variations
to this base model, and therefore will effectively explore this very question.
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2.2 Extension to an Entangled System
Schulman’s one-particle model does not assign conditional probabilities to instanta-
neous states, but rather joint probabilities to entire histories: it is the entirety of the
anomalous rotation angle α that appears in Eqn (1). This feature allows a natural
extension of the one-particle model to a two-particle system, where each particle has
a local spin-vector. For two spin-1/2 particles, if S1, the spin-vector of particle P1,
undergoes an anomalous rotation of angle α, and S2, the spin-vector of particle P2,
undergoes an anomalous rotation of angle β, it is natural to define the unnormalized
joint probability of these two events to be simply W (α)W (β).
Remarkably, this usual combination of joint probabilities is all that is needed to
recover a retrocausal explanation of Bell-inequality violations, in terms of spacetime-
local beables (the two spin-vectors). Specifically, we are interested in reproducing the
Born rule as applied to an entangled singlet (Bell) state (|01〉 − |10〉)√2, but without
using such a non-local state to describe the system.
Instead, we can simply model the preparation of such an entangled system as a
local, classical correlation between two distinct and localized spin-vectors: S1 and S2
are initially constrained to point in opposite directions, but that direction is completely
unspecified. This is not to say that each vector has a uniform probability distribution
over all directions; the probabilities are assigned to entire histories, not instantaneous
states. Rather, the absolute direction of S1 is unconstrained, meaning that all possible
directions should be considered when constructing the possibility space on which the
weights W (α)W (β) can be assigned. But with this caveat aside, this merely describes
“classical entanglement”: a purely conventional correlation between two unknown pa-
rameters. Learning the initial S1 would precisely inform us about the initial S2, and
vice-versa.
After this classically-entangled pair of particles is produced, P1 is sent to Alice, and
P2 is sent to Bob. Both Alice and Bob freely choose spin measurements to perform
on the particles they receive. Using the above analysis, this is effectively Schulman’s
one-particle model applied twice; S1 undergoes an anomalous rotation of α to match
one of the two allowed outcomes of Alice’s setting, and S2 undergoes an anomalous
rotation of β to match one of the two allowed outcomes of Bob’s setting. What links
the probabilities of the two outcomes is merely the classical entanglement imposed
locally at the preparation.
From (1) it follows that W (0) ≫ W (α) for any α ≫ γ. But the free parameter γ
must be very small, or else (2) would deviate from Born rule probabilities [7]. And if
γ is below experimental precision, α would be much larger than γ for any measurable
non-zero angle. The joint probability W (α)W (β), then, will be dominated by cases
where either α or β is zero (or at least comparable to γ, which is indistinguishable from
zero). In other words, the small value of γ makes two separate anomalies very unlikely:
the probability distributionW (α)W (β) will essentially force all of the anomaly to occur
on either P1 or P2, not a combination of both.
An explicit example may be useful to highlight this crucial conclusion. Suppose
Alice and Bob choose setting angles that are separated by an acute angle θ. In the
special case that the original S1 (and −S2) is aligned halfway between these two
settings, both particles need at least a θ/2 anomalous rotation to match the future
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boundary conditions. Since γ is much smaller than θ, the biggest possible value of
W (α) is about 4/θ2, and W (β) is also maximum at 4/θ2, so the joint probability of
this scenario is W (α)W (β) = 16/θ4. There are less likely cases as well, including
anomalous rotations of (pi − θ/2), etc.
But in the special case that S1 is exactly aligned with Alice’s future setting, then
W (α) is 1/γ2, and W (β) is 1/θ2 (all the anomaly is on S2). The joint probability of
this scenario is W (α)W (β) = 1/(θγ)2. In the limit that γ ≪ θ, this joint probability
is overwhelmingly more probable than the case in the previous paragraph. So its
overwhelmingly more probable that the original spin orientation will happen to be
aligned with one of the future settings. (The retrocausality is quite evident here; more
on this below.)
The conclusion that either α or β must be indistinguishable from zero makes anal-
ysis of the general case trivial. Again, define the net angle θ between Alice’s and Bob’s
measured spin directions. If α = 0 and all of the anomalous rotation is in β, then
this is essentially the same one-particle problem as before: Alice’s setting chooses the
axis that the original S1 is aligned with, and the preparation ensures that S2 is in the
opposite direction. This vector must then anomalously rotate by either θ (mod 2pi) or
θ + pi (mod 2pi) to match Bob’s setting, and the probabilities of such a rotation are
the same as in the one-particle case. The same probabilities can also be recovered if
β = 0, by simply switching Alice and Bob in this analysis.
The only complication here is that Alice can no longer choose her outcome; she’s
now in the same position as Bob, at another future boundary. This means that there are
now four relevant joint probabilities to consider instead of two. Alice’s measured spin-
vector will either be aligned with her measurement setting (call this outcome A = 0) or
anti-aligned (A = 1). Similarly, Bob’s measured spin-vector will either be aligned with
his measurement setting (call this outcome B = 0) or anti-aligned (B = 1). For the
two outcome scenarios where A 6= B, the required anomalous rotation (on either α or
β, but not both) is simply θ (mod 2pi). For the two outcome scenarios where A = B,
the required rotation is pi + θ (mod 2pi). But since the anomaly is overwhelmingly
likely to be on just one particle (either S1 or S2), the calculation already performed
in (2) is also the answer here. Given the above assumption that γ is smaller than any
measurable angle,
P (A 6= B)
P (A = B)
=
P (θ)
P (pi + θ)
=
cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2) tanh2(γ/2)
sin2(θ/2) + cos2(θ/2) tanh2(γ/2)
. (3)
In the γ → 0 limit one can normalize these probabilities and find that the correlation
P (A 6= B)− P (A = B) becomes simply cos(θ), as would be expected from traditional
quantum theory on a Bell state.
This correlation violates the Bell inequalities, but does not violate Bell’s theorem
because it is retrocausal. Specifically, Bell assumed that any hidden variable distribu-
tion could not depend on the future measurement settings. To see how this assumption
is explicitly violated here, notice that (because α = 0 or β = 0) the original spin-vectors
at preparation will always be aligned (or anti-aligned) with one of the measurement
settings eventually chosen by Alice or Bob. One knows nothing about this “hidden
variable” until after Alice and Bob make their setting decisions, and as above, it is
immune to the bilking argument. Because the hidden variable of the initial spin-vector
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alignment is effectively caused by the eventual measurement choice, the premises be-
hind Bell’s theorem are explicitly violated; these so-called “retrocausal loopholes” are
also available for other no-go theorems.
With this model in hand, we can now address the Wood-Spekkens challenge via
explicit analysis, and attempt to determine whether or not the no-signaling aspects of
this model are fine tuned.
3 Tuning the Model
The above model does have one obvious free parameter, γ, which cannot quite be zero
without making the probabilities ill-defined. This section will explore the consequences
of varying γ in (1). The Born rule is only recovered in the limit that γ → 0, so varying γ
will deviate from the Born Rule. If such deviations would also allow signaling between
Alice and Bob, this would be evidence for Wood-Spekkens fine-tuning, and indeed
would demonstrate the precise parameter in question. However, it will turn out that
this is not the case.
3.1 Effect on Probabilities
The above analysis for the entangled state can be reproduced for the case where γ is
not eventually set to zero. Again, θ is the angle between Alice’s setting and Bob’s
setting. Outcome A is when Alice’s measured spin vector S1 points in the direction of
her chosen setting; outcome A¯ is when S1 is opposite this direction. Similarly, Bob’s
two outcomes are denoted by B and B¯.
The first difference, due to a non-zero γ, is that the entire anomaly is no longer
forced to be on one particle or the other. (That earlier conclusion concerned angles
that were much larger than γ.) But what matters in these experiments is actually the
relative probability W (α)W (β) given only the net rotation δ = α+ β (summing over
all the intermediate ways that a given net rotation could occur). This can be calculated
with a straightforward convolution of two Lorentzians:
W (δ) =
∫
∞
−∞
W (δ + φ)W (δ − φ)dφ = a(γ)
δ2 + (2γ)2
. (4)
The result is that Schulman’s single-particle anomaly weight also applies to the net
rotation of two particles. The only difference is that γ is effectively doubled; a(γ) is
an irrelevant constant that vanishes when normalized.
As before, one must sum over all of the different rotations that end up at the
same angle, modulo 2pi. The result is an unnormalized joint probability J(δ) for a net
rotation of an angle 0 ≤ δ < 2pi:
J(δ) =
∞∑
n=−∞
a(γ)
(δ + 2npi)2 + (2γ)2
=
b(γ)
sin2(δ/2) + cos2(δ/2) tanh2(γ)
. (5)
Again, b(γ) is an irrelevant constant.
With this exact result, we can reanalyze the above entanglement scenario for a non-
zero γ. Recall that the initial preparation forces Alice’s particle and Bob’s particle to
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initially have opposite spins. So if they choose the same setting angle (θ = 0), and
no anomaly occurs, they will always measure opposite outcomes. Specifically, JAB¯,
the (unnormalized) joint probability of the outcomes A and B¯, will be proportional to
J(0). (And so will JA¯B; the symmetry of this model only concerns relative angles.)
But for a more general setting angle difference of θ, a net anomaly of δ = θ will be
required for these same anticorrelated outcomes. Therefore, dropping constants,
JAB¯ = JA¯B = J(θ) =
1
sin2 (θ/2) + cos2 (θ/2) tanh2 (γ)
. (6)
Similarly, for correlated outcomes, a net anomaly of δ = |pi−θ| is generally required.
The joint probabilities for these two pairs of outcomes (both with the same required
anomaly) are therefore
JAB = JA¯B¯ = J(pi − θ) =
1
cos2 (θ/2) + sin2 (θ/2) tanh2 (γ)
. (7)
Note that because of the finite γ, even if θ = 0, (6) will no longer be infinitely larger than
(7). So even for the same settings, there is still a non-zero probability for correlated
outcomes; this is our first direct indication that a finite γ will deviate from Born-rule
probabilities.
These joint probabilities form a complete set of all possible outcomes (given the
boundary constraints), and so can be normalized by dividing by their sum;
Z ≡ JAB + JAB¯ + JA¯B + JA¯B¯ (8)
Performing this calculation (P = J/Z), the actual probabilities of each of the four
outcomes can be extracted.
PAB¯ = PA¯B =
cos2(θ/2) + sin2(θ/2) tanh2(γ)
2 + 2 tanh2(γ)
, (9)
PAB = PA¯B¯ =
sin2(θ/2) + cos2(θ/2) tanh2(γ)
2 + 2 tanh2(γ)
. (10)
Clearly, the Born rule is violated, but not the no-signaling condition! Bob has
effective control over the setting-angle difference θ, but the marginal probability that
Alice measures (say) outcome A turns out not to depend on θ:
PA = (PAB + PAB¯) =
1
2
. (11)
This is exact, even for the finite γ that deviates the above probabilities from the Born
rule.
3.2 Deviation from the Tsirelson Bound
The mathematical necessity of the small finite parameter γ gives this model a nice
feature that may have other uses (beyond fine-tuning arguments). While it is easy
to come up with models that yield different probabilities than quantum theory, it is
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not particularly easy to come up with a model that smoothly deviates from these
probabilities via some continuous parameter.
One point of possible interest in such a model would be to address questions con-
cerning the ultimate nature of the Tsirelson bound. This bound concerns the key term
in the CHSH inequality [8]:
S ≡ |E(a1, b1) + E(a1, b2) + E(a2, b1)− E(a2, b2)|. (12)
Here a1 and a2 are two possible angle settings for Alice, and b1 and b2 are two possible
angle settings for Bob. For any given settings, the correlation E is
E = PAB + PA¯B¯ − PA¯B − PAB¯ . (13)
This value S is provably bounded by 2 for classical systems (for any possible hidden
local instructions, sent with the two particles), but can in principle be as large as 4
without allowing signaling (as in the case of the Popescu-Rohrlich boxes [9]).
In the quantum mechanical case, however, the upper limit of S is known as the
Tsirelson bound with the intermediate value:
SQM ≤ 2
√
2. (14)
There has been much speculation concerning why quantum theory lets us get somewhat
beyond the classical limit, but not all the way to the conceptual limit.
The above model provides a unique tool to see how this limit on S can be smoothly
varied, via the parameter γ; at this stage it is unclear whether it will increase or
decease. To start with, we assumed that the maximum value of S will occur at the
same angle settings as in the standard quantum case where γ → 0:
a1 = 0,
a2 = pi/2,
b1 = pi/4,
b2 = −pi/4.
(15)
With these angles, the above equations can be utilized to calculate S(γ) in the
γ 6= 0 retrocausal model:
S(γ) = 2
√
2 ·
(
1− tanh2(γ)
1 + tanh2(γ)
)
≡ 2
√
2 ·K(γ). (16)
The function K(γ) approaches one as γ → 0, recovering the standard (14). But for
any other γ, K(γ) is always less than 1; S(γ) therefore never exceeds SQM .
We further ensured that the angles (15) used for the settings did indeed provide the
maximum value of S. To achieve this, we performed numerical simulation to calculate
S when a2, b1 and b2 had small independent angle deviations from (15) . After many
iterations and full combinations of small angle deviations (with a range of ± pi/100,
divided into 200 steps, and γ = 0.1), we were unable to find any values for which
S exceeded S(γ) as given in (16). Given that K(γ) ≤ 1, these retrocausal models
therefore deviate from the Tsirelson bound, but always on the lower side; the bound is
never violated.
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4 Discussion
One of the particular benefits of explicit hidden-variable models is that one can examine
behavior down at the ontological level, even if that behavior is not evident at the higher-
level operational level. This is particularly useful for questions such as causation-
without-signaling, because without signaling, there is no operational-level indication
that any causation is happening at all.
In this case, the causation is evident. Taking the interventionist account of cau-
sation (which is the only real option that does not utilize a temporal arrow [10]),
causation can be defined in terms of what would be different under a counterfactual
intervention. In this case, the intervention is Alice’s (or Bob’s) choice of the setting an-
gle. Comparing counterfactual angles is easy for an explicit hidden variable model; one
simply runs the model with various settings; any difference in the resulting parameters
is caused by Alice’s (or Bob’s) intervention, according to this account.
Given this definition, it is simple to see that in the above model Alice can cause
something to happen on Bob’s path. If Alice chooses the same setting as Bob (θ = 0),
then no anomaly can possibly occur on his path. But if Alice chooses a different
setting, an anomaly must occur somewhere on Bob’s path. (Half of the time, anyway,
but this is an essential difference from it never occuring.) This model does not specify
exactly when the anomalous rotation of Bob’s particle must finish, but it obviously will
be complete before it is measured, such that it will conform to the future boundary
condition. So in this model, Alice can certainly cause things to happen well outside of
her light cone, over on Bob’s particle before it is measured.
Incidentally, the model also demonstrates that the net effect of Alice’s outside-the-
lightcone causation is not action at a distance. Indeed, this is a continuous model
with all the connections on the particle worldlines, and none of the worldlines are ever
spacelike. The net effect may be that she can cause things to be different, at some
region that is spacelike-separated from her, but the mechanism behind this effect can
clearly be given a Lorentz-covariant account.
And yet, despite this clear spacelike-causation, there is no spacelike-signaling in this
model, even when the parameter γ is not forced to zero. The Wood-Spekkens argument
[1] implies that this model must be fine-tuned to prevent signaling, and evidently the
fine-tuning does not occur on the obvious free parameter γ. Further consideration is
clearly required.
Instead of first calculating the probabilities for each of the four outcomes in Section
3.1, we could have simply gone ahead and computed the marginal probability that Alice
measures (say) outcome A, as in (11). In terms of the unnormalized joint probabilities
J , this is easy to do:
PA =
JAB + JAB¯
JAB + JAB¯ + JA¯B + JA¯B¯
. (17)
But looking at the denominator, it is evidently just twice the numerator because
JAB = JA¯B¯ , (18)
JA¯B = JAB¯ . (19)
It is the equivalence between these outcome probabilities that is seemingly responsible
for the inability of Alice or Bob to signal in this model.
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Mathematically, the reason that these probabilities are equal is that Schulman’s
probabilities only depend on the absolute rotation angle, not the direction. Mirror-
imaging the spin state of both particles leads swaps both Alice’s outcomes and Bob’s
outcomes without changing the relative angles. Equations (18) and (19) follow directly
from this reflection symmetry allowed by the original preparation.
Of course, it is certainly possible to violate this symmetry; even in quantum theory,
these equations generally only hold for maximally entangled states. Unfortunately,
Schulman’s model is not trivially extendable to partially-entangled states; for these
cases, a richer local hidden variable space is required [11], and the corresponding model
is still under development [12]. But of course Schulman’s model can represent separable
states, such as sending a spin-up particle to both Alice and Bob, and in that case (18)
and (19) would generally fail.
In the separable case, the signaling disappears because the probabilities on the
two particles are independent (learning about one particle’s history does not inform
anything about the other particle). This means the joint probabilities are necessarily
factorizable; JAB = JAJB, etc., and (17) simplifies down to the expected JA/(JA+JA¯).
Nothing Bob can do would have any impact on Alice’s measurement at all, even in this
retrocausal model.
But the crucial point is that this model is indeed fine-tuned, in the sense that there
is a much larger space of related retrocausal models for which Eqns (18) and (19) do
not hold, and some of those other models could yield nonlocal signaling. For example,
if W (α) was not equal to W (−α), then non-local signaling would almost certainly be
possible. The ultimate reason that this model does not allow non-local signaling is
therefore the symmetry-motivated assumption W (α) =W (−α).
This explicit analysis shows that “fine tuning” is too broad a critique if it rules
out symmetry arguments that restrict the form of the model. It seems to us that any
symmetry-based restriction should be deemed a reasonable form of fine-tuning; at least,
one that should not necessarily carry connotations of unreasonable model-rigging. In
this case, at least, the relevant symmetry entered in via Schulman’s effort to find a
fully time-symmetric account of the Born rule as applied to a spin-1/2 state. Given
that symmetry considerations restricted the original single-particle model, it should
not be particularly surprising that special cancellations (on the signaling level) are a
natural consequence.
With this point laid out explicitly, it sheds some doubt on using fine-tuning argu-
ments to assess generic causal models of fundamental physics where natural symmetries
can be exact. Until a model is in hand, it’s difficult to see whether the details that
lead to operationally-invisible causation are due to some perfect natural symmetry or
an unnatural model-rigging.
Still, the use of fine-tuning arguments in causal discovery algorithms for complex
higher-level systems is not particularly tarnished by this analysis, because symmetries
at those scales are not generally exact. (Higher-level symmetries can easily be broken.)
And even in the case of quantum entanglement, one can apply this analysis to cases
without explicit models. If operationally-invisible causation is most naturally explained
by hidden symmetries, this tells us something important about the best way to causally
explain entanglement.
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5 Conclusions
The central example in this paper concerned one specific retrocausal model, where the
no-signaling condition turned out to be strictly enforced by a natural symmetry. This
same conclusion can be reached from other retrocausal models in the literature, such
as an earlier one proposed by Argaman [13]. In that model, a similar symmetry results
from a natural way to distribute the hidden variables among the initial particles (each
allowed hidden option has an equal probability).
If one takes such fundamental symmetries to be the best explanation of the Wood-
Spekkens fine-tuning argument, their argument can be redirected in an effort to find
the most natural causal explanations of Bell-inequality violations. The insight pro-
vided above is that accounts of causation-without-signaling are far more natural in
scenarios that utilize symmetries. The more symmetries that are present in a given
model, the more opportunity those symmetries will have to naturally hide the causal
dependencies of that model. This does not merely apply to cases of (effective) nonlocal
causation without nonlocal signaling, but also related issues such as retrocausation
without backward in time signaling. The conclusion is that if one hopes to naturally
restrict signaling without unnatural fine-tuning, one should look for models with an
abundance of symmetries. These need not be restricted to the symmetries used above
in the case of maximally-entangled states; one obvious addition would be Lorentz sym-
metry.
Consider the three live options for (spacetime-local) causal explanations of Bell-
inequality violations, as presented in the Introduction: models that are superluminal,
retrocausal, or superdeterministic. In the case of the latter, some distant past common
cause correlates the hidden parameters in the preparation of the entangled state with
the decisions of Alice and Bob as to how to set their measurements. This scenario is
sometimes ridiculed as “conspiratorial”, because this process must work no matter how
Alice and Bob come to their measurement setting decision. Alice could use a lottery
machine, and Bob could rely on a mere whim.
Superdeterministic models, therefore, must continue to yield the same correlations
even as the relevant system is expanded to include the (different) ways in which Alice
and Bob might make their decisions. To the extent that this bothers most people
as “conspiratorial”, perhaps this underlies a more quantifiable concern: the Wood-
Spekkens fine-tuning argument is now in force between systems with no underlying
relational symmetry. Somehow, no matter how different a process Alice and Bob use
to make their decisions, these decisions are just correlated enough to yield the right
entanglement correlations, and not more. Consider how simple it would be, given such
superdeterministic causal pathways, to literally correlate Alice’s and Bob’s decisions,
so that they could signal to each other without any entangled particles at all. They
could merely make separate decisions and know that their choices were correlated
because of superdeterministic causes. Preventing such signaling (while maintaining
the perfect non-signaling correlations) would indeed be unnaturally conspiratorial, and
it is therefore reasonable to use the Wood-Spekkens argument to rule out any such
superdeterminstic causal connection.
Similarly, models with superluminal influence suffer not only from a broken Lorentz
symmetry, but also from a special causal role that must be granted to either Alice
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or Bob, but not both. In order to preserve some semblance of causal order, such
models usually assume there is some (hidden) preferred-reference frame in which these
new influences are instantaneous. Unless Alice and Bob’s measurements are exactly
simultaneous in this special frame, one of them is always the cause of the superluminal
influence and the other is the mere effect, even though the measured correlations do not
indicate that one of them is playing a special role. If this broken symmetry is restored,
where influence is always allowed to go both ways (no matter when the measurements
occur), then these models become retrocausal as well as superluminal.
Instead, the maximal symmetries seem to lie in the sector of retrocausal models,
where the future measurement constraint on the entangled particles is a contributing
cause of the earlier hidden variables. Lorentz symmetry is evidently recoverable; the
influence is all on the time-like trajectories, and no matter who “measures first”, the
very same underlying account is always available. So long as the space of allowed final
outcomes provide the constraint, Alice and Bob could use different types of devices to
measure the same outcome without breaking this symmetry on the particles themselves.
Furthermore, many of the motivations for considering retrocausal models are based
on time-symmetry [4, 5, 10, 14, 15], and this would seem to be another resource for
“natural fine-tuning”. By implying hidden symmetries, the no-signaling aspects of
entanglement correlations might themselves be another reason to seriously consider
retrocausal models.
The model discussed in this paper is the most explicit spacetime-local and contin-
uous account of entanglement correlations that has yet been developed, and many of
its key assumptions may have a deeper and more general explanation [6]. Despite its
inability to address partially-entangled states, it is a clear stepping-stone on a gener-
ally unexplored path to a full (retro-)causal explanation of entanglement phenomena.
And when the role of symmetries is properly taken into account, the Wood-Spekkens
fine-tuning argument might actually steer us towards this particular path, at least as
compared to every other spacetime-local option. The alternative is to prematurely
retreat from causal or local explanations entirely, a step that we do not think should
be taken while such promising approaches still remain on the table.
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